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PHILIPP. FRICKEY33 
If the next generation of constitutional scholarship is anything 
like its forebears, we can anticipate another generous supply of Big 
Think. Grand Theory is great, perhaps even essential, but it gets 
messy in application. The same can be said for the interdisciplinary 
yearnings of some public law theorists. I have two humble sugges-
tions. One is that constitutional scholarship retain the vitality, but 
recognize the vulnerability, of its interdisciplinary aspirations. The 
other is that we take Justice Brandeis's suggestion of fifty little labo-
ratories of jurisprudence seriously. Since these proposals have little 
connection except for their humility, I will simply discuss them in 
turn. 
Constitutional scholarship has an ever-increasing interdisci-
plinary component. Why this is so may be rather obscure. To be 
sure, some of us are really frustrated historians or political scien-
tists, or unreconstructed deconstructionists. The interdisciplinarily 
unsated among us can play doctor for a day, all the while knowing 
that they will not be held to the standards of the "true" academic 
and will receive brownie points for trying. Interdisciplinary work 
may enhance the scholarly reputation of the law professor around 
the campus; heaven forbid, it might even tell us something really 
interesting. 
For whatever it may be worth, I like and admire interdisciplin-
ary work. On the whole, it is more intellectually rewarding, and 
more fun to read, than other-worldly Grand Theory or dreary doc-
trinal case crunching. Thoughtful interdisciplinary insights can re-
veal the world beyond law, through which we can understand law 
better. I would suggest, however, that legal scholars pay more at-
tention to two problems. First, legal scholarship tends to be the 
garbage can or the bargain basement of academe. Constitutional 
scholars, in particular, tend to pick up on themes at just about the 
time of their demise in the allied fields that generated them. Sec-
ond, such scholars should weave interdisciplinary insights into a 
legal fabric; if we fail to do that, we have not done the only thing for 
which we are especially qualified. For example, state institutions 
for the mentally retarded may be ghastly, but scholars other than 
law professors are better situated to evaluate all but the most obvi-
ous questions of treatment alternatives and other issues. Law 
professors, working in tandem with other academics, could make a 
unique contribution, however, by addressing legal issues such as the 
role which structural injunctions might play in helping (or interfer-
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ing with) reform. Law professors who do that work must be sensi-
tive to, perhaps even greatly assist with, the work of other 
academics, but should not forget the real limitations of their train-
ing and understanding. As Mark Tushnet once wrote, we are sub-
ject to the "lawyer as astrophysicist" myth, that any lawyer can 
read a physics book over the weekend and send a rocket to the 
moon on Monday. 
State constitutional law was roundly ignored until, beginning 
in the late 1970s, liberal law professors retreated in despair to state 
supreme courts, hoping to find them more receptive to activism 
than the Burger Court had become. Today state constitutional law 
has become the haven for arguments rejected in the federal courts. 
Why not invert the analysis-why not see whether federal constitu-
tional law might profitably borrow from arguments accepted by 
state courts in interpreting state constitutions? For example, the 
Supreme Court has fallen into a morass attempting to decide issues 
associated with the separation of powers (for example, the nondele-
gation doctrine and the legislative veto). In doing so, the Court 
gave no hint of being aware that some state supreme courts have 
had interesting things to say on such subjects under their own con-
stitutions. It might seem demeaning for constitutional scholars to 
dirty their hands with state cases, but ultimately it might be more 
valuable than many of the other things we routinely do. 
CARL A. AUERBACH34 
My dissatisfaction with the constitutional scholarship of law 
professors is long-standing. That scholarship is devoted primarily 
to the analysis of Supreme Court opinions, yet generally neglects 
the critical examination of their legislative fact assumptions and so-
cial consequences. In this Bicentennial year, I know of no work by 
a law professor evaluating the structural foundation which the Con-
stitution erected for a democratic republic. 
When the Constitution was adopted, we were an underdevel-
oped nation with a small homogeneous population living mostly on 
farms. Little, if anything, has been written on whether the Consti-
tution's structure of federalism and the separation of powers contin-
ues to suit a large, pluralistic nation that spans a continent and 
possesses the most developed economy functioning in an interde-
pendent world-a nation that has assumed global responsibilities. 
Yet there has been a spate of writing on whether Garcia v. San 
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